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Corporate Tax Reform: The Key to
International Competitiveness
ABSTRACT

This Note responds to "Integrationof the Individual and Corporate Tax
Systems: Taxing Business Income Once," a study the United States Department of the Treasury released on January 6, 1992. This Note explores some of the issues and concerns of integrationand considers arguments in support of and against the United States system of taxation. The
latter portion of this Note addresses the relationship between international economics and integration,focusing on the potentialfor international competitive disadvantage under the classical tax system. The author concludes that Congress should read the Treasury's study as a
legislative proposal and act upon it to bolster the United States economic
competitiveness.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the United States Department of Treasury (the Treasury)
urged integration of the corporate and individual tax structures.' Nine
years later, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 directed the United States Secretary of the Treasury to study reforms of corporate income taxation.'
Originally targeting January 1988 for completion of its study,' the Treasury released it in January 1992." Fifteen years after the Treasury first
recommended integration, this study reaches the same conclusion.'
The stated purpose of the report6 is to initiate debate on the merits of
integration.7 Although the Treasury did not intend its report to be a
legislative proposal, 8 one might read it as one.' Given the prevalence of
integrated tax systems among the United States trading partners"0 and
1. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977).

2. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. Id.
4. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter
INTEGRATION].

5. Id. at v.
6.

The report is a comprehensive study of the potential issues arising out of an inte-

gration of the corporate and individual tax systems.
7. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at ix.
8. Id.
9. Although the Treasury professed neutrality, its preference for one particular
method of integration, the dividend exclusion prototype, is evident. The Tieasury believes "[tihe dividend exclusive prototype ... would, with few changes in current law,
implement many of this Reports' key policy recommendations. The principal advantage
of the dividend exclusion prototype is its simplicity and relative ease of implementation."
Id. at 17.
10. Integration is becoming quite popular in other nations. Seven of the European
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the potential for international competitive disadvantage if the United
States tax system remains unintegrated, Congress should treat this report
as a legislative proposal and act on it.

This Note illuminates and discusses some of the issues and concerns
that led the Treasury to recommend adoption of a plan to integrate the
individual and corporate tax systems in the United States. This Note
synthesizes the principal arguments for and against the current system in
the United States, outlines various models of integration, and addresses
selected topics concerning international economics and tax policy in an
increasingly interconnected, global economy. The last section addresses
the most serious consequence of the classical system, the overuse of debt.
II.
A.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM

The Classical System

Current United States tax law imposes taxes on corporations as separate entities, apart from the tax imposed upon their owners. 1 One effect
of this system is that income earned at the corporate level is taxed
twice-first at the corporate level, and again at the individual shareholder level when it is distributed as dividends. 2 There are methods to
circumvent this double tax. Structuring distributions to shareholders as
deductible payments rather than as dividends is one method of circumventing the double tax.' One example is the use of debt instead of equity to finance corporations. 4 Although the double tax burden may seem
Community (EC) member states and four non-EC states use the imputation system of
integration. Sijbren Cnossen, Overview, in WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT

261, 262 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1988). Seven of the member states of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) use a dividend deduction or split-

rate system. Id. The remaining five OECD member states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States) still use the classical system. Id. at
262-63.
11. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at v.
12.

Id. at 1. To illustrate, suppose a corporation has $1,000,000 of taxable income.

Because this corporation has taxable income in excess of $335,000, this corporation
would be taxed at a flat rate of 34%, I.R.C. § ll(b)(1) (1992), and owe taxes of $340,000.
Having thus paid its taxes, if the corporation were to distribute the remaining $660,000
in dividends, that $660,000 would be taxed again at the shareholder level. To simplify
the calculation, assume the entire amount goes to shareholders in the top marginal rate,
31%. Under these assumptions, the shareholders would owe $204,600 in taxes on the
$660,000 received as dividends. The effective tax rate on this $1,000,000, thus, is 54.46%

($340,000 + $204,600 = $544,600 total tax paid, or 54.46% of $1,000,000).
13. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 5 (3d ed. 1991).

14. See, e.g. Peter C. Canellos, Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By De-
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inequitable, there are some arguments supporting taxing the cot'poration

and its shareholders separately.

B. Arguments for the Classical System
If one ascribes to the view that a corporation is a separate being,"
then it follows that the corporation is an appropriate subject of taxation;
there is no double tax because the corporation is an entity separate from
its shareholders. 6 A C corporation is typically a large, publicly held organization in which shareholders are not active participants but rather
distant investors." It is reasonable to tax a shareholder's income from
corporate investments as well as income from the shareholder's primary
taxable activity because the shareholder is not involved in the operation
of the corporation's business activities. However, the more active the
shareholder becomes in corporate operations the less reasonable the
double tax imposed by the classical system becomes.' 8
Equity urges the taxation of corporations as separate entities. The increase in economic power derived from adopting the corporate form is an
advantage for which a corporation should pay.' 9 Moreover, in an era of
budget deficits, the need for a broad tax base necessitates the taxation of
corporations as separate entities.2"

fault?, in

A REPORT OF THE INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE
129, 136 (George K. Yin ed., 1988). When a corporation is financed
with debt, the same $1,000,000 of corporate income distributed as interest to bondholders
bears no tax at the corporate level. Income is thus subject to a total federal tax of 31% if
distributed to the highest marginal bracket individual, and no tax at all if distributed to a
tax-exempt investor.
15. The Supreme Court declared corporations to be "persons" within the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886), and protected by the Due Process
CORPORATE TAX REFORM:

ON SUBCHAPTER C,

Clause, Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1888).
16. Canellos, supra note 14, at 130.
17. The public, or C corporation, is "an association of individuals, organized to further a common purpose, and possessing a combination of attributes (e.g., continuity of
existence, limited liability, separate legal entity, centralized management and transferability of interests) which distinguishes [it] from other forms of association." LEWIS D.
SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1

(2d ed. 1988).
18. This is especially true in the context of closely held corporations, in which the
shareholders are often employees of the corporation. See, e.g., Canellos, supra note 14, at
130. Under the classical system, this shareholder would be taxed twice on the same
activity.
19. Id. at 130.
20. See, e.g., LIND, supra note 13, at 21.
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An interesting argument in favor of the classical system is that the
double tax burden really does not present a competitive disadvantage because C corporations primarily compete against other C corporations.2"
Thus, the argument goes, the playing field is not so uneven as critics of
the classical system suggest, especially because the corporation presumably passes the burden of the double tax on to consumers.2 2 Classical system advocates also question the success rate of the various integration
schemes currently used by some of the United States trading partners.2 3
C. Criticisms of the Classical System
The most fundamental criticism of the classical system is that the
double tax is actually an indirect tax on shareholders.2 4 Instead of the
corporation treating the tax as a cost of doing business and passing it on
to customers, the classical system allegedly passes the cost of the tax on

to shareholders in the form of decreased dividend payments. 25 The fact
that the law treats a corporation as a distinct legal entity, apart "from
that of its managers, shareholders, and employees cannot change the fact
that a tax can ...affect the well-being of those who work for or own the
[corporation], or consume its products. ' 26 From this perspective, the
double tax appears to be patently unfair. It violates vertical equity 27 by
subjecting income earned indirectly by shareholders in different tax
brackets to the same corporate tax rate.2 8 The double tax also violates
horizontal equity 29 by subjecting income an individual earns from corpo-

21. Canellos, supra note 14, at 130-31.
22. Id. This argument is flawed, however, because some C corporations, especially
smaller ones unable to qualify for S corporation treatment, may compete primarily with
partnerships and S corporations. In addition, C corporations must increasingly compete
in the international arena, in which many of the participants operate under integrated
tax systems. See Cnossen, supra note 10, at 262.
23. Canellos, supra note 14, at 132.
24. Id. at 131.
25. See id.
26. JOHN A. KAY & MERVYN A. KING, THE BRITIsH TAX SYSTEM 153 (5th ed.
1990).
27. Vertical equity refers to the distributive and redistributive implications of taxa-

tion, that is, how tax liabilities are assigned to people at different income levels. Id. at
141. For example, the Internal Revenue Code imposes different tax rates on people at
different income levels. See I.R.C. § 1 (1992).
28.

KAY & KING,

supra note 26, at 153. Even if the individual shareholder is in the

lowest tax bracket or is exempt from paying income tax altogether, that shareholder
effectively pays a tax rate of 34% on the corporation's taxable income prior to its distribution of dividends. See supra note 14.
29.

Horizontal equity refers to the practice of imposing the same tax rate on all
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rate dividends to a differeht effective tax rate than income the same individual earns directly or through a partnership or S corporation. °
The classical system also distorts the decision-making process."' Perhaps the most publicized effect of the classical system on the decisionmaking process is its encouragement of the use of debt rather than equity
for financing,3 2 which creates leverage problems.3 3 Over-reliance on debt
results in reduced investment in the corporate sector and increased corporate vulnerability to bankruptcy.34 Over-reliance on debt also has a
substantial negative impact on corporate tax revenues.3 5 By permitting
the relatively unrestricted use of debt, the classical system has created, in
effect, a dividends-paid deduction without assuring that the ultimate recipient is a taxpayer rather than a tax-exempt entity. 6 Rules to combat
the "evasion" of the double tax are difficult to draft, and there seems to

be an inclination to facilitate transactions that ease the double tax
burden.

37

income a person receives. KAY & KING, supra note 26, at 41.
30. Id. If an individual taxpayer must use the C corporation form instead of the S
corporation form, or if the nontax benefits of the corporate form more closely fit the
taxpayer's needs than does the partnership form, that taxpayer will be subjected to a
much higher tax rate. See id.
31. The Treasury specifically identified three inherent distortions in decision-making: (1) an incentive to invest in noncorporate rather than corporate businesses, (2) an
incentive to finance corporate investments with debt rather than equity, and (3) an incentive to retain earnings or to structure the distribution of earnings so as to avoid the
double tax. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at vii.
32. The preferential tax treatment of debt arises from the fact that interest payments,
unlike dividends, are deductible business expenses under section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 163 (1992); see also Canellos, supra note 14.
33. See Canellos, supra note 14, at 131.
34. CHARLES E. McLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 26'
(1979).
35. See Michael J. Graetz, The Tax Aspects of Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate FinancialRestructuring Transactions,42 TAX NOTES 721, 722 (1989). Current
estimates suggest that for every dollar of equity financing a corporation replaces with
debt financing, the United States loses 400 of income tax revenue. Id. The principal
reason for this loss of revenue lies in the composition of corporate investors. Graetz estimates that only half of the corporate stock and five percent of the corporate bonds in the
United States are owned by individuals, while the remainder is owned by tax-exempt
investors. Id. When one considers that 100 billion dollars of equity has been replaced
annually by debt in recent years, it is no wonder the United States has a revenue
problem.
36. Canellos, supra note 14, at 138-39. A kind of unofficial integration system thus
exists, allowing corporate income to be attributable to corporate investors who are holders of debt instruments. Id.
37. Id. at 139.
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The classical system also distorts the decision-making process with respect to the distribution of corporate earnings."8 This is of particular
concern to free market economists, who lament the effect that the disincentive to distribute corporate earnings has on the market.3 9 Artificially
high reiention rates permit corporations to reinvest funds without passing the test of the marketplace, resulting in investment in projects that
may not yield the highest social rate of return.40 Critics also assert that
the classical system is responsible for depressing the rate of economic

growth, 41 reducing the level of investment,42 and interfering with the efficient allocation of resources.43
An often overlooked problem with the classical system is its growing
obsolescence in the world economy." If the United States continues to
adhere to the classical system while its trading partners and the rest of
the world convert to integrated tax systems, the United States could find
itself at a tremendous competitive disadvantage.4 Moreover, the more
burdensome the classical system becomes, the more methods corporations
will find to circumvent the double tax. 46 The result will be a less rational
47
tax structure, lost tax revenues, and increased compliance burdens.

38. Id. at 131.
39. See id. at 131-41. When a corporation retains earnings, its shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to make their own choices with respect to how those earnings
will be reinvested because corporate management makes the decision instead. Id.
40. McLURE, supra note 34, at 25.
41. Id. at 7.

42.

INTEGRATION,

supra note 4, at 1.

43. Id.
44. See supra note 10.
45. The EC poses a particular challenge because most of its member states have
integrated tax systems. Id. The EC is poised to become a serious competitor with the
United States, and it is quite possible that the United States will lose investors and corporations to EC member states.
46. The Internal Revenue Code is rife with sections mitigating the tax burden. Most
important, perhaps, is the opportunity for closely held businesses to operate as S corporations, allowing them to obtain pass-through treatment and be subject to a single level of
tax. LIND, supra note 13, at 21. If the organization cannot qualify for S corporation

treatment, there are a number of self-help integration techniques available. For example,
a corporation might pay its shareholders deductible compensation, I.R.C. § 162(a)(1)
(1992) or interest, I.R.C. § 163 (1992). The corporation might also pay for shareholders'
food and lodging expenses, I.R.C. § 119 (1992), travel expenses, I.R.C. § 162(a)(2)
(1992), provide life insurance, I.R.C. § 79 (1992), or medical and accident insurance,

I.R.C. §§ 105(a)-(b) (1992).
47.

Canellos, supra note 14, at 147.
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SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS?

An Introduction to Integration

Adopting an integrated system of taxation would produce several benefits. Integration would eliminate, or at least reduce, the double taxation
of corporate income."8 In the case of the United States, integration would
move the tax system "in the direction of more neutral taxation of corporate income ' ' and reduce the distortions in decision-making caused by
the double tax regime.50 The United States could realize other benefits

from an integrated system, such as reducing the cost of capital for corporate investment, encouraging the use of "capital structures less vulnerable to instability in times of economic downturn,"5 1 increasing the capital
stock in the corporate sector by 125 billion to 500 billion dollars, decreasing the debt-asset ratio in the corporate sector by 1 to 7 percentage
points, and producing an annual gain to the economy of 2.5 billion to 25
billion dollars.5 2
1. Basic Models of Integration
There are two broad categories of integration models: full integration
and partial integration. 53 Full, or complete, integration eliminates the
tax on corporate income and applies pass-through treatment to C corporations and their shareholders, the same treatment currently reserved for
S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships.5 4 Under the full
integration scheme, income earned at the corporate level, whether or not
it is distributed, is treated as shareholder income and taxed at the rate
applicable to the individual shareholder.55
Partial integration affords tax relief for dividends paid by a corporation.5" There are three basic variations of the partial integration model.
Under one variation, shareholders would receive a tax credit equal to
some percentage of dividends received from the corporation. 57 This
48.

MCLURE,

supra note 34, at 2.

supra note 4, at 15.
50. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
51. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at vii.
49.

INTEGRATION,

52. Id. at vii-viii.
53.

LIND,

supra note 13, at 22.

54. Id.
55. McLURE, supra note 34, at 3. This is the purest form of integration and arguably the most equitable. By affording pass-through treatment, both horizontal and vertical
equity are achieved. See supra notes 27, 29.
56. See LIND, supra note 13, at 22.
57. Id.

19921
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would effectively treat corporate income tax as a type of withholding tax
with respect to income distributed to the shareholders. 8 In another variation, the Treasury might allow shareholders to exclude all or a portion
of the dividends they receive from their gross income. 59 A third variation
would allow corporations to deduct some or all of the dividends paid to
shareholders, similar to the deduction currently allowed for interest
payments.60
2.

Policy Issues

Several policy concerns influenced the Treasury's evaluation of the
prototypes it examined. First, the Treasury does not want to extend the
benefit of corporate level tax preferences to shareholders. 6 Second, the
Treasury does not want to reduce the total tax collected on corporate
income that is distributed to tax-exempt investors.6 2 These policies reflect
a recognition of the need to maintain tax revenues. Third, the Treasury
is concerned about the effect that integration could have on foreign investors and the foreign taxes paid by domestic corporations.13 Consequently,
the Treasury recommends that integration benefits be denied to foreign
shareholders.64 It also recommends that taxes which domestic corporations pay to foreign states receive different treatment from taxes paid to
the United States.

58.
59.

65

supra note 4, at 15. This is the imputation credit model. Id.
Id. This is the dividend exclusion model favored by the Treasury. Corporate
INTEGRATION,

shareholders already may do this in certain circumstances under section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
60.

McLURE, supra note 34, at 3. This is the dividend-paid deduction model. Id.

61. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at 15. While tax preferences may reduce the corporate level tax, current law does not extend the preference to shareholders, instead taxing
all income distributed to shareholders as ordinary income. Id.
62. Id. Under current law, tax-exempt investors are not completely exempt from tax
because corporate income is still subject to tax at the corporate level, at a maximum rate
of 34%, regardless of the tax-exempt status of the dividend recipient. Id. at 15-16; see
also supra note 28.

63.

INTEGRATION,

supra note 4, at 16.

64. Id. The Treasury concluded that this issue would be handled better through
treaty negotiations so as to achieve reciprocity. Id.
65. Id. Again, the Treasury concluded that treaty negotiations would be a more appropriate forum in which to decide the proper allocation of tax revenues between the
source state and the taxpayer's state of residence. Id.
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The Treasury's Prototypes

1. Dividend Exclusion Prototype
The dividend exclusion prototype is the model the Treasury favors.'
Under this prototype, corporations would calculate their income under
current rules and continue to pay tax at a rate of thirty-four percent.67
Shareholders, however, generally would exclude dividends from their
gross income.0 8 Although distributed and retained income would be
taxed at the thirty-four percent rate, the shareholder level tax on dividends would be eliminated.6 9 All other distributions would receive the
same tax treatment rendered under current law.1 0
The dividend exclusion model would retain the corporate tax preferences available under current law." By allowing shareholders to exclude
only those dividends on which the corporation has paid the full tax, however, the Treasury would not extend these tax preferences to the shareholders.7 2 To avoid extending tax preferences to shareholders and exempting foreign source income from any United States tax, the Treasury
would place strict limits on the amount of excludable dividends.7
Implementation of the dividend exclusion model would require adding
a new account to the corporate books to aid in determining- whether fully
taxed income is the source of corporate distributions.7 ' The Excludable
Distributions Account (EDA) would measure the corporation's supply of
fully-taxed income; from the EDA, the corporation would be able to pay
excludable dividends.7 5 The EDA would monitor the actual corporate
taxes paid and convert that amount into an equivalent amount of aftertax income that the corporation could then distribute to its shareholders. 6 The dividend exclusion model would ensure that the distributed
66. See id, at 17. The Treasury determined that this model could accomplish most of
its policy recommendations and at the same time offer simplicity. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. This would retain the current system whereby tax-exempt shareholders are
subjected to tax at the corporate level. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. This would retain the current system whereby income that benefits from a
tax preference is not taxed at the corporate level but is taxed at the individual share-

holder level. Id.
73. Id. at 19. The corporate alternative minimum tax, which curbs the excessive use
of tax preferences at the corporate level, therefore, would be retained. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76.

Id. [Annual additions to EDA = (U.S. tax paidlO.34) - (U.S. tax paid) +
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income would be taxed at the full corporate rate regardless of the tax
bracket or exemption status of the dividend recipient."
The EDA would not complicate significantly the existing tax report-

ing system. Corporations would have to report to shareholders and the
Internal Revenue Service the excludable and taxable portions of dividends paid,"8 and shareholders would include taxable dividends just as
they do under the current regime. 9 The Treasury recommends making
adjustments to the EDA in the current year to avoid recharacterizing
dividends paid in prior years at both the corporate and shareholder
levels.8 0
The Treasury does not maintain that the dividend exclusion model
would be ideal, or that it would, by itself, reverse the tax system's bias
toward debt financing. 8 ' In fact, this prototype would not change significantly the treatment of debt and, therefore, would not alter the ability of
those who invest in corporate debt to receive income free from tax at the
corporate level.82 Another problem with the dividend exclusion model is
that it would compromise vertical equity.8 3 The Treasury's response to
this argument is simplicity: the dividend exclusion prototype would reduce the transition burden, and if policymakers later desired to tax distributed income at individual shareholder rates, they could devise a system to refund excess tax collections.8 4
2.

Shareholder Allocation Prototype

The shareholder allocation model would extend integration to retained
earnings by attributing income to the shareholders as the income is

(excludable dividends received)] Id. Thus, for each $34 of taxes paid, the corporation
could pay $66 of excludable dividends (assume for simplicity that no dividends were

received by this corporation). Each $1.00 of corporate taxes paid would support $1.94 of
excludable dividends, or in the inverse, each $1.00 of excludable dividends must be supported by at least $0.52 of corporate taxes paid. Id.
77. Id. at 19-20.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 21.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 22. Shareholders whose individual marginal tax rates are lower than
the corporate rate still would be (indirectly) taxed at the 34% corporate rate. The Treasury counters this argument with data indicating that approximately two-thirds of corporate dividends are paid to taxpayers with marginal tax rates of more than 25%. Id. at 22.
Moreover, since lower bracket shareholders obviously own some property (the shares in
question), it is not clear that their lower bracket indicates less ability to pay. Id.
84. See id.
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earned.8 5 Shareholders would report this income and receive a tax credit
for taxes paid by the corporation."6 Retained and distributed earnings
would thereby receive equal treatment."7 The Treasury does not endorse
this prototype because of its complexity and its policy implications.8 8 Despite its drawbacks, however, it is the model that full integration advocates endorse."9
The Treasury condemns this model's administrative complexityY° The
shareholder allocation model would require corporations and shareholders to amend instruments governing outstanding corporate stock. 9 ' Corporations also would have to maintain capital accounts similar to those
required of partnerships.9 2 The reporting requirements would create
chaos if a shareholder sold or acquired stock in the middle of the year.9
Accounting requirements would be more complicated even for shareholders paying lower marginal rates. 4 Maintaining the corporate level taxation does assure, however, the taxation of income distributed to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders.95 Shareholders would be required to
make adjustments to the basis in their stock, increasing the basis by the
amount of taxable income allocated to them, less their share of any distributions to the shareholders, tax-exempt income, or corporate taxes
paid."

85. Id. at 27.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
89. Id. Note that this model does differ from the pass-through ideal: (1) losses are
not passed through to shareholders, (2) the corporate level tax is retained, (3) only an
aggregate income is reported to shareholders, and (4) integration benefits are not extended to tax-exempt shareholders or to foreign shareholders unless done so by treaty. Id.
at 27.
90. Id.
91. Id,
92. Id.

93. See id.
94. See id. at 27-28. To insure compliance and mitigate cash flow problems for
shareholders, the system would require the corporation to pay income tax at the corporate rate and then allow shareholders a tax credit, similar to the operation of withholding
taxes. Id. at 27. Shareholders with marginal rates less than the corporate rate could use
this tax credit against other income but would not be entitled to a refund. Id. at 27-28.
The administrative complexity arises from the additional reports and forms that corporations would have to make available to shareholders, the trouble of dividing income and
tax credits between shareholders who may have held stock for less than a year, and the
presence of varying classes of stock within each corporation. See id.
95. Id. at 30.
96. Id. at 28.

TAX REFORM
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The shareholder allocation model significantly deviates from the Treasury's policy goals concerning its treatment of tax preferences. Unlike
the dividend exclusion model, the shareholder allocation prototype extends tax preferences to shareholders.97 The Treasury determined that
modifying the basic model to avoid such treatment would be too difficult
and would result in a system inconsistent with the pass-through nature
of this prototype."
The difficulties with tax preferences were not the Treasury's primary
reason for rejecting the shareholder allocation model.99 The primary reasons for rejecting this model were administrative concerns' 00 and the extreme difficulty in allocating income to shareholders who held shares for
less than a year.' 0 '
3.

Comprehensive Business Income Tax Prototype

The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) model is the most
comprehensive of the integration prototypes." 2 The major drawback to
this system is the Treasury's estimate of the length of time necessary to

implement it.'

3

CBIT represents the ideal: a very long-term, compre-

hensive method designed to equalize the tax treatment of debt and
04
equity.
OBIT would promote economic efficiency by equalizing the treatment
of debt and equity, 0 5 by decreasing the difference between corporate and
noncorporate forms of business,' and by reducing the tax distortions

97. Id. at 30. For example, if a corporation earned tax-exempt income, such as interest on a municipal bond, this income would not be included in its taxable income. Thus
tax-exempt income would not be allocated to shareholders. Id. at 31.
98. Id. at 30. Doing so would convert the shareholder allocation prototype into distribution-related integration. The dividend exclusion prototype could accomplish this
more simply. Id.
99. Future legislation could restrict or even eliminate tax preferences. See id.
100. See id. at 27. An important consideration would be the increased reporting burdens for corporations and shareholders. Id.
101. Id. at 35.
102. Id. at 39.
103. The Treasury estimates that full implementation would require a phase-in period of at least ten years. Id.
104. See id. Because the Treasury believes that it is unlikely that CBIT will be
implemented in the near future, its technicalities will be omitted. See id.
105. Id. Equal treatment of debt and equity would reduce or eliminate the current
tax regime's bias toward debt. Id.
106. Id. Equal treatment of corporate and noncorporate forms would presumably
eliminate the current bias against the corporate form, an anomalous condition for a capitalist state.
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between retained and distributed earnings.117 CBIT would not allow deductions for dividends or interest paid by the corporation, but would include in income any dividends or interest that shareholders or debt holders receive.' 0 8 Furthermore, CBIT would apply to all but the smallest
businesses, regardless of the form in which they were conducted. 109 The
result would be a single level of tax on all capital income businesses
earn." 0 Interest and dividend income would be subject to a uniform level
of tax, equal to the top individual rate of thirty-one percent, regardless
of a taxpayer's marginal tax rate or tax-exempt status."' Although tax
preferences would pass through to shareholders under CBIT, this disadvantage would be easily corrected through legislation." 2
In addition to facilitating many of the Treasury's policy goals, CBIT
could provide another major advantage: simplification of the Internal
Revenue Code.' 3 Provisions relating to the prevention of excessive and
mismatched interest deductions would become unnecessary, as would
provisions seeking to uncover the true character of a corporation's capital

structure.
IV.

INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

A.

The Cost of Capital

1. Theory
A state's tax system, whether it is classical or integrated, affects corporate decision-making. One area of impact is the cost of capital, which is
simply the pre-tax rate of return sufficient to cover items such as operating expenses, taxes, economic depreciation, inflation, and investors' required rate of return." 4 The following is an example of the decision
process under the classical system.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

See id. at 43.
Id. at 52.
114. Id. at 3.
113.
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2.

Illustration

Assume a potential investor, "A," desires to earn a ten percent aftertax return on investment." 5 In order to accomplish this goal, A's investment must earn a return high enough to yield a ten percent return after
paying tax at A's marginal tax rate of thirty-one percent" 6 If A invests
in a corporation, that investment must earn a return high enough to pay
the corporate tax of thirty-four percent and A's individual tax of thirtyone percent. The high cost of capital thus discourages investment in the
corporate sector because it is inefficient for A to invest in a corporation
when A can invest in a noncorporate venture and earn a higher rate of
return. Assuming all of the other components of the cost of capital are
equal, the differences are set forth below:
Effect of the Classical System on Investment Decisions

A's desired rate
of return

Noncorporate
Investment

Corporate
Investment

10%

10%

Required rate of
return

14.49%'11

21.96%118

Under an integrated tax system, the bias would not be as great and
the nontax advantages of using the corporate form might outweigh any
difference in the rate of return between corporate and noncorporate investments." 9 Assume investor A again has the same desire to earn a ten
percent return on investment. This time, however, A is investing under a

115. Ten percent is an arbitrary number, chosen for simplicity.
116. Assume that A is in the top marginal rate bracket and that all income A earns
on this investment will be taxed at a flat rate of 31%.
117. The formula for determining the rate of return that a noncorporate investment
must earn given A's tax rate is as follows: rate of return = (A's required rate of return)I(1 - A's individual tax rate). Thus, the rate of return is 14.49% [rate of return
(0.10)1(1 - 0.31) = 0.1449, or 14.49%].
118. The formula for determining the rate of return that a corporate investment
must earn given A's tax rate and the corporate tax rate is as follows: rate of return =
(A's required rate or return)f((1 - A's individual tax rate)*(1 - corporate tax rate)).
Thus, the rate of return is 21.96% [rate of return = (0.10)/((1 - 0.31)*(1 - 0.34)) =
0.2196, or 21.96%].
119. See supra note 17. For example, A may be willing to give up 1%each year in
return for the protection afforded by the limited liability aspect of the corporate form.
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tax system that has a dividend exclusion method of integration.12 0 If A
wants to invest in a corporation, that investment must earn only enough
to cover the corporate tax rate. 121 Again, assuming all of the other components of the cost of capital are equal, the differences are as follows:
Effect of an Integrated System on Investment Decisions
Noncorporate
Investment

Corporate
Investment

B's desired rate
of return

10%

10%

Required rate of
return

14.49%122

15.15%123

Although a difference in the rate of return still exists, the magnitude of
the difference is considerably less and other advantages of using the corporate form may mitigate that difference. Taking into account the nontax advantages of the corporate form, investment in a corporation might
24
actually yield a higher return for A.'
3.

International Implications: Corporate Location

The tax system affects decisions regarding the location of corporate
operations. For example, if corporate operations will earn a fifteen percent pre-tax rate of return anywhere in the world, where should the
investor locate the corporation? For simplicity, assume that the investor,
A, has a choice between State X and State Y. State X uses the dividend
exclusion model of integration; State Y uses the classical system. Assume
that both State X and State Y have the same tax rates for individuals,
120. See supra section III(B)(1).
121. See id. Under the dividend exclusion model, the corporation pays tax at the
corporate rate and the shareholders exclude dividends paid from fully taxed corporate
income. Id.
122. The formula for determining the rate of return thata noncorporate investment
must earn given A's tax rate is as follows: Rate of return = (A's required rate of return)f(1 - A's individual tax rate). Thus, the rate of return is 14.49% [rate of return
= (0.10)1(1 - 0.31) = 0.1449, or 14.49%].
123. The formula for determining the rate of return that a corporate investment
must earn under the dividend exclusion model given the corporate tax rate is as follows:
Rate of return = (A's required rate of return)/(1 - corporate tax rate). See INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at 18. Thus, the rate of return is 15.15% [rate of return = (0.10)1
(I - 0.34) = 0.1515, or 15.15%].
124. See supra note 119.
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thirty-one percent, and for corporations, thirty-four percent, and that all
else is equal. The differences are as follows:
Effect of Integrated System on Investment Decisions

Corporate rate of
return
A's rate of
return

Investment in
State X

Investment in
State Y

15%

15%

9.99%125

6.83% 126

Given these assumptions, it is highly improbable that A would choose to

establish the corporation in State Y if A were free to choose the corpo1
rate location. 1

7

A consideration of the macroeconomic affects of a nation's investment
decisions illustrates the impact of the classical system on international
investment decisions.1 28 One measure is the ratio of corporate investment
to the total noncorporate sector investment in areas such as housing and
unincorporated business. 2 9 Comparing Australia, France, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, the Treasury noted that the
United States has had the lowest ratio of corporate to noncorporate investment during the latest three years for which data is available.1 3 0

125. The formula for determining the actual rate of return that A would receive
given the rate of return earned by A's corporate investment under the dividend exclusion
model is as follows: A's actual rate of return = (corporate rate of return)*(1 - corporate tax rate). See INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at 18. Thus, A's actual rate of return is
9.9% [A's actual rate of return = (0.15)*(1 - 0.34) = 0.099, or 9.9%].
126. The formula for determining the actual rate of return that A would receive
given the rate of return earned by A's corporate investment under the classical system is
as follows: A's actual rate of return = (corporate rate of return)*(1 - corporate tax
rate)*(1 - A's individual tax rate). Thus, A's actual rate of return is 6.83% [A's actual
rate of return = (0.15)*(1 - 0.34)*(1 - 0.31) = 0.0683, or 6.83%].
127. These assumptions disregard the possibility that A may have ties to a particular
state which A may be unwilling to relinquish, despite the economic costs.
128.
129.

INTEGRATION,

supra note 4, at 5.

See id.

130. Id. The United States is the only state in this group that does not use some
form of an integrated tax system. See supra note 10.

526

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

B.

[Vol 25.509

The Corporate Tax Wedge

1. Theory
The corporate tax wedge is the difference between the pre-tax return
on corporate investment and the cost of funds used to generate this return.1 31 When all else is equal, capital tends to flow from states with
higher tax wedges to states with lower tax wedges.1 2 This may not re-

sult in the efficient allocation of capital.'

For example, if the tax

wedges between the two states differ, equal after-tax returns on an in-

vestment will fail to yield the equal pre-tax returns required for the efficient allocation of capital, and the result is an overall decrease in welfare.134 The Treasury's data are as follows:

Corporate Tax Wedges for Selected Countries -

1991135

State

Corporate Tax Wedge

Japan

1.4

Canada

1.2

United Kingdom

0.9

United States

0.8

'Germany

0.6

France

0.4

For example, the corporate tax wedge of Japan is higher than that of
the United States, which may partially explain the high volume of Japanese investment in the United States; however, other questions of global
allocative efficiency remain.
131. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at 5. The size of the wedge depends on a variety
of factors including the type of asset acquired, the corporate tax rate, and capital recovery allowances (depreciation). Id.
132. A. Lans Bovenberg et al., Tax Incentives and International Capital Flows:
The Case of the United States and Japan, in

TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

283, 297 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
133. Id. at 297-98.
134. Id. at 298. Investors do not necessarily invest capital in the state which yields

the highest pre-tax return, resulting in inefficiencies. See supra note 127.
135. INTEGRATION, supra note 4, at 6. In the context of this Note, the riumerical
values are less critical than their comparative magnitudes.
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2.

Illustration

Assume that A has the opportunity to invest in a corporation in State
X or in State Y. For purposes of this illustration, also assume that A is a
resident of the state in which A chooses to invest."3 6 Assume that State X
imposes an effective corporate tax rate of thirty-five percent,13 and the
cost of production in State X..8 is such that A's investment would earn a
fifteen percent rate of return. Assume that State Y imposes an effective
corporate tax rate of sixty percent, but the cost of production is lower
and A's investment would earn a twenty percent rate of return. Because
the pre-tax rate of return is higher in State Y, A's allocation of resources
would be efficient if A were to invest in State Y. As demonstrated below,
however, this is not the case:
Effect of the Corporate Tax Wedge on Investment Decisions

Rate of return
Effective tax rate
Comparative corporate
tax wedge
A's rate of return

State X

State Y

15%
35%

20%
60%

small

large

9.75%139

8.00%140

These tax systems provide A with the "wrong" incentive. Instead of in-

vesting in the state in which an investment would provide greater pretax returns and result in an efficient allocation of resources, A will invest

136. Making A a resident of the state in which A chooses to invest eliminates the
complicated calculations that would be required to ascertain the domestic treatment of
income earned abroad.
137. Instead of considering whether State X's tax system is integrated or not, the
concern here is the bottom line, i.e. the total percentage of tax imposed on the shareholder and corporation. See supra note 12. The assumption here is that a higher effective
rate will yield a larger corporate tax wedge.
138. The cost of labor and cost of capital comprise the costs of production.
139. The formula for determining the actual rate of return that A would receive
given the rate of return earned by A's corporate investment in State X is as follows: A's
actual rate of return = (investment's rate of return)*(1 - the effective tax rate). Thus,
A's actual rate of return is 9.75% [A's actual rate of return = (0.15)*(1 - 0.35)
0.0975, or 9.75%].
140. The formula for determining the actual rate of return that A would receive
given the rate of return earned by A's corporate investment in State Y is as follows: A's
actual rate of return = (investment's rate of return)*(1 - the effective tax rate). Thus,
A's actual rate of return is 8.00% [A's actual rate of return = (0.20)*( - 0.60) 0.0800, or 8.00%].
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inefficiently.
Note that if the corporate tax wedge were equal in both states, A
would make the efficient investment decision.""' Suppose that the effective corporate tax rate in both states is thirty-five percent, and A is free
to choose the state in which to invest. 42 Assume that A's investment
could earn a fifteen percent rate of return in State X, and a twenty percent rate of return in State Y.
Effe'ct of the Corporate Tax Wedge on the Investment Decision

Investment's rate
of return
Effective tax rate
Comparative corporate
tax wedge
A's rate of return

State X

State Y

15%
35%

20%
35%

equal

equal

9.75%143

13.00%144

These tax systems would not distort A's decision making, and A would
invest in the state in which the investment would provide a higher
return.
3.

International Implications

The solution to global economic inefficiency appears to be complete
tax harmonization between states, thereby providing equal tax incentives
to invest in each state. 145 As a practical matter, however, complete tax
harmonization is impossible, in part because the issues which shape a
state's tax policy vary dramatically from state to state.' 46 For example, a
141. Making the above calculations based on equal effective tax rates in State X and
State Y would demonstrate this.
142. See supra note 134.
143. The formula for determining the actual rate of return that A would receive
given the rate of return earned by A's corporate investment in State X is as follows: A's
actual rate of return = (investment's rate of return)*(1 - the effective tax rate). Thus,
A's actual rate of return is 9.75% [A's actual rate of return = (0.15)*(1 - 0.35) =
0.0975, or 9.75%].
144. The formula for determining the actual rate of return that A would receive
given the rate of return earned by A's corporate investment in State Y is as follows: A's
actual rate of return = (investment's rate of return)*(1 - the effective tax rate). Thus,
A's actual rate of return is 13.00% [A's actual rate of return = (0.20)*(1 - 0.35) =
0.1300, or 13.00%].
145. See Bovenberg et al., supra note 132, at 314.
146. Id.
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greater concern for environmental protection or a national policy favor-

ing labor-intensive production may prompt a state to implement a tax
14
policy that is more or less favorable to capital accumulation. 7

V.

TAX POLICY CONCERNS IN AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

A.

Perspective

"Although the 'international tail' should not be allowed to wag the
'domestic dog' of integration, the tail cannot prudently be ignored."' 14
The formulation of tax policy is primarily a domestic issue, yet international concerns dominate the implementation of a state's tax policy.' 49
Differences in tax rates and tax systems influence the global pattern of
production and trade and affect corporate choices regarding the states in
which goods are manufactured, savings are derived, and investment takes
place.150 A brief survey of some of the tax rates and systems employed by
selected states illustrates the variety of systems currently in use.

147. See id.
148. McLURE, supra note 34, at 15.
149. See McLURE, supra note 34, at 49. If domestic tax policy becomes too onerous,
corporations may relocate or devise methods to avoid taxation, thereby negatively impacting the taxing government's revenues. See supra note 46.
150. See supra subpart IV(C). Note that the state with the lowest corporate tax
wedge, France, has one of the highest corporate tax rates.
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Survey of Selected Tax Systems

State

Tax Revenues as
Percentage of
Gross Domestic
Product'

Federal or
National
Corporate
Tax Rate

Type of
Corporate
Tax 2

28%
32%
37%
21%
44%
35%
29%

39%153

Integrated
Integrated
Integrated
Integrated
Integrated
Integrated
Classical

Australia
Canada
France
Japan
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States

28%154

42%155
37.5%156
35%157
35%158

34%159

System1

The states that have integrated tax systems do not necessarily employ
identical forms of integration. 6
B.

The Integrated Global Economy

The ramifications of a state's tax policy extend beyond the policy's
direct impact on the behavior of corporations within that state's borders. 6 ' The tax policy of one state can affect economic activity in
others' 6 2 by altering the incentives for foreign investment in those
151. Kenneth C. Messere, Overview, in WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT 277, 285 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1987).

152. Id. at 282-83.
153.

PRICE WATERHOUSE WORLD FIRM LIMITED, CORPORATE TAxEs: A WORLD-

WIDE SUMMARY

9 (1992).

154. Id. at 70. Note that an additional surtax is added to this rate. Id.
155.

Id. at 157.

156.

Id. at 271. For the sake of consistency and comparison with the other states in

this table, this is the top rate on corporate income. The first 8 million yen earned is taxed
at 28.0%. Id. Above 100 million yen, the entire amount is taxed at 37.5%. Id.
157. Id. at 364. Again, this is the top rate. The first 250,000 Guilder is taxed at

40%. Id.
158. Id. at 552. Again, this is the top rate. A 25% tax rate applies to companies
earning below a certain level of tax-adjusted profits.
159. Id. at 559. In the United States, all corporate income over $335,000 is taxed at
a flat rate of 34%. Id. Lower rates of 15% and 25% apply to taxable income under

$75,000. I.R.C. § ll(b)(l) (1992).
160. See Messere, supra note 151, at 282-83.
161. Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod, Introduction to TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 1, 5 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
162. Id. at 1.
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states.16 3 This can lead to the inefficient allocation of resources between
states. 1 As barriers to trade and investment crumble, the effect of differences in tax systems on corporate activity will be exacerbated and may
lead to an increasingly inefficient allocation of resources as well as self6 5
defeating fiscal competition between states.'
1. International Fiscal Competition
Some differences in tax systems are intentional. For example, a state
could set lower corporate tax rates in order to attract foreign corporations.1 6 Attractive as this idea may be to policymakers, it is not without
costs. Gains attributable to this type of policy come at the expense of the
state's trading partners. 1 7 Those trading partners are likely to react by
making similar and reciprocal changes in their own tax systems.' 66
The result of this type of fiscal competition is an inefficient allocation
of global resources and lower tax revenues for all states involved.' Fiscal competition results in lower tax revenues and allocative inefficiencies
because the gains to the first state are likely to be less than the costs to
the rest of the world.' There is, therefore, a common interest in avoiding such competition,' but this interest has not been strong enough to
1 72
fully avoid the problem.
The challenge to United States policymakers in adopting tax legislation is to balance the desire to preserve tax revenues against the potential
impairment of the international competitiveness of United States corporations.' 3 Integrating the tax system in the manner the Treasury proposes would not lower the corporate tax rate to attract corporations to

the United States. 174 Instead, integration would alter the tax rate to
shareholders, thus removing the distortions inherent in the classical sys-

163. Id. at 3.
164. Id. at 1; see also supra Part IV.
165. Razin & Slemrod, supra note 161, at 1.
166. KAY & KING, supra note 26, at 200-201.
167. See id. at 201.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The EC has had some success in limiting the use of industrial subsidies and
coordinating regional policies, but "the opportunity to apply similar principles to corporate tax systems has been more limited." Id.
173. Razin & Slemrod, supra note 161, at 2.
174. See supra section IV(A)(1).
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tern' 75 and reducing the competitive disadvantage currently facing
United States corporations.' 6
2.

International Tax Enforcement

Just as states differ with respect to tax systems and the policy behind
those systems, so do they differ in the vigor and success with which they
enforce their tax systems. 1 77 Moreover, most governments lack the incentive and ability to enforce the tax laws of. other states.'7 8 The result is
that governments impose controls on the flow of trade and capital across
their borders to protect domestic revenue without
concern for the inhib1 79
iting effect such controls may have on trade.
Policymakers must balance the need to protect domestic revenue
against the significant cost of impairing the international competitiveness
of domestic business interests.' Adopting some form of integration does
not present a major obstacle to this balancing process. As it evaluated the
various means of accomplishing integration, the Treasury had revenue
preservation as a paramount objective 81 and its recommendations reflect
that goal.
3.

Jurisdiction

Which state is entitled to collect the tax due on a particular transaction or set of transactions is extremely important.'
Generally, a tax
treaty settles the jurisdictional issue, allocating the revenues earned be-

tween the source state and the residence state.1 83 Multinational corporations account for a growing proportion of economic activity and have the
greatest opportunity to arrange their transactions to minimize their tax

175. See, e.g., supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
176. See supra subpart IV(B). A corporation operating under the classical system of
taxation must earn a much higher pre-tax rate of return in order to attract investors
away from investments in states with integrated tax systems. Id.
177. KAY & KING, supra note 26, at 198.
178. Id. at 207-08.
179. Id. at 198.
180. Razin & Slemrod, supra note 161, at 2.
181. See supra section III(A)(2).
182. KAY & KING, supra note 26, at 198.
183. The source state is the state in which income is generated. See, e.g., Hugh J.

Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing InternationalIncome: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 11, 12 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990). The residence state is the state in which the
taxpayer is a resident. See id.
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liability." 4 Consequently, jurisdictional issues arise frequently in the
context of corporate tax.' 85

Implementation of an integrated tax system would not significantly
affect the jurisdiction issue. Tax treaties are already in effect, and the
Treasury does not recommend extending the benefits of integration to
foreign investors.'8 " Moreover, the Treasury does not believe that the
foreign taxes which domestic corporations pay should receive the same
treatment as those taxes which domestic corporations pay to the United
States.117 The Treasury concluded that if some alteration of the existing
mechanisms was desired, treaty negotiations would be a more appropriate forum because such negotiations would encourage reciprocity from

other states.'8 8 With reciprocity, the world would come closer to achieving complete tax harmonization and an integrated global economy.'8 "

C.

Double Taxation

The overriding principle governing international taxation is the simple
notion that an entity should not be required to pay tax twice on the same
income.' 90 The United States imposes taxes on its residents, individual

and corporate, on a worldwide basis.' Nonresident aliens, individuals,
and corporations are subject to United States tax only to the extent that
they earn income in the United States.

92

When a corporation earns in-

come in more than one state, it is potentially exposed to double taxation-that due to the state of incorporation' 9 3 and that due to the state in

184. KAY & KING, supra note 26, at 205.
185. See id.
186. See supra section III(A)(2).
187. See id.
188. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
189. While this may not be the ideal to which nationalists would ascribe, it would
improve global allocative efficiency. In this era of increased worldwide concern for the
environment and preservation of scarce resources as well as increasingly interdependent
economic markets, perhaps nationalist ideals are becoming as outdated as the classical
system of taxation.
190. Ault & Bradford, supra note 183, at 27.
191. Id. at 12; I.R.C. § 61(a) (1992). Individuals are subject to United States tax if
they are citizens of the United States, regardless of their actual place of residence. Cook
v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). Corporations are subject to United States tax if they were
incorporated in the United States, without regard to their place of business, place of
management, or place of shareholders' residence. See, e.g., CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON &
RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONs 45
(1991).
192. Ault & Bradford, supra note 183, at 12.
193. This assumes that the state in which a corporation is incorporated imposes a
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which the income is earned.
To avoid double taxation on income, states commonly employ credit
systems whereby the state of incorporation cedes the primary right to tax
the corporation to the state in which the corporation earned its income. " " The state of incorporation will usually retain a secondary right
to tax the income earned in the foreign state to the extent that the foreign tax rate is lower than the tax rate in the state of incorporation.1 95
Consider the following situation where a corporation incorporated in the
United States earns income in a foreign state:

Net Effect When United States Tax Exceeds Foreign Tax
Foreign-source income earned
United States tax on worldwide income19 6
Less: Foreign tax credit19 7

$1,000,000
$ 340,000
(300,000)

Net tax owed to the U.S.

$

40,000

Note that the reverse is not true. If the foreign tax rate is higher than
that in the state of incorporation, the corporation cannot use the excess
foreign taxes paid to offset income earned in the state of incorporation.
For example, if a United States corporation earns income in a foreign
state that is subject to a higher tax rate in the foreign state, the following
result is obtained:

worldwide tax on income, as does the United States. See supra note 191.
194. Ault & Bradford, supra note 183, at 12.
195. Id.
196. Assume a flat corporate tax rate of 34%, so that tax on $1,000,000 would be

equal to $340,000 [($1,000,000)*(0.34) = $340,000].
197. The foreign tax credit is equal to the lesser of the foreign tax paid or the United
States tax that would be owed on the amount of the foreign income. I.R.C. § 901 (1992).
Assume that the foreign tax rate is 30%. The foreign tax paid would be $300,000
[($1,000,000)*(0.30) = $300,000]. The United States tax that would be owed on the
amount of foreign income would be $340,000 [($1,000,000)*(0.34) = $340,000]. The
lesser of these two amounts, $300,000, is the amount of the foreign tax credit.

TAX REFORM

1992]

Net Effect When Foreign Tax Exceeds U.S. Tax

Foreign-source income
U.S. tax on worldwide income 98
Less: Foreign tax credit1 99
Net tax owed to the United States

$1,000,000
$ 340,000
(340,000)
$
0

Given the inequities of imposing a double tax in the international context, it is surprising that there is not more support in the United States
for an integrated tax system. An integrated tax system would replicate
the results achieved in the international context.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The use of debt to finance corporations, one of the primary ways to
avoid the classical tax system's double taxation of corporate income, can
have deleterious consequences, particularly in economic recessions. A
corporation financed by debt is legally obligated to make interest payments to debtholders regardless of its financial condition.20 0 Confronted
with inflexible interest payments, many corporations have difficulties in
weathering economic downturns.
Failure to legislate relief from this double taxation has created the
incentive to develop self-help means of integration as corporations struggle to provide integration's economic benefits in order to attract investors.
To stay competitive, United States corporations are moving their operations to states that provide more favorable tax treatment. As corporations

198. Assume a flat corporate tax rate of 34%; thus tax on $1,000,000 would be
$340,000 [($1,000,000)*(0.34) = $340,000].
199. The foreign tax credit is equal to the lesser of the foreign tax paid or the United
States tax that would be due on the amount of the foreign income. I.R.C. § 901 (1992).
Assume that the foreign tax rate is 50%; the foreign tax paid would be $500,000

[($1,000,000)*(0.50) = $500,000]. The United States tax that would be due on the
amount of foreign income would be $340,000 [($1,000,000)*(0.34) = $340,000]. The
lesser of these two amounts, $340,000, is the amount of the foreign tax credit.
200. If a corporation tries to avoid this consequence by tying the payment of interest
to the performance of the corporation, the Internal Revenue Service is likely to
recharacterize the debt as equity and tax it to the corporation and shareholders accordingly. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385'(1992); see also Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76
F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding that payment obligations to creditors are independent of corporate success).
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move to other states the economic health of the United States is jeopardized. With jobs, money, and innovation leaving the United States, it is
time for the United States Congress to take legislative action. Eliminating the double tax on corporate distributions would be a step in the right
direction.
Ann Louise Hardman*

* The author thanks Professor Allaire Urban Karzon, Associate Professor of Law,
Vanderbilt University School of Law and Mark A. Cernicky for their invaluable assistance with this Note. This Note is dedicated to Richard W. and Louise H. Hardman.

